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With the end of Cold War, the nature and consequences of conflict
changed significantly in the world. Today there is conflict more between
the peoples of a country than between countries. Thus, the reasons of
conflict are changing with the lapse of time. As the number of deaths
owing to conflict has been accelerating in the recent decades, it is of
utmost importance to look into its causes. Against this backdrop the
present study makes a modest attempt to find out the causes and correlates
of conflict and its intensity using cross-sectional data of 75 districts of
Nepal.
The Maoist conflict in Nepal started in 1996 from two districts of
Mid-Western Development Region and spread all over the country within
a decade. All 75 districts except two, Manang and Mustang, reported
casualties as high as more than 13,000, and more than 200,000 displaced
persons. After more than a decade, the conflict came to a halt with the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord on 21 November 2006. With
this event, people’s expectation has increased, which needs to be properly
managed by the Government of Nepal; otherwise, the possibility of
conflict relapse cannot be ruled out. Previous experiences of post-conflict
countries reveal that there is 39 percent risk of conflict relapse in the first
five years and an additional 32 percent risk in the next five years of postconflict situation. This signifies the importance of looking into the
dissatisfaction and causes of conflict while devising conflict prevention
strategies.
The cost of conflict varied widely across regions and areas of
Nepal. The direct cost in terms of number of killings was highest in the
Mid-Western Development Region and lowest in the Eastern
Development Region. The conflict was intensified with the mobilization
of army in 2001, which lead to the highest number of casualties in 2002
and a higher number of killings by that state, compared to those by the
Maoist rebels. Local political workers were at the top of the list of people
killed, followed by agricultural laborers, implying that the rural population
and poor were more vulnerable to conflict risk.
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There was a wide variation in the number of people killed across
the districts, even among the districts of the Mid-Western Development
Region, ranging from 30 in Humla to 904 in Dang, which implies that the
level and intensity of conflict depended on a multitude of factors. On the
whole, the average number of persons killed in a district of Nepal was
178. Excluding the Mid-Western Development Region, all other regions
had their district averages less than the national average. This implies that
the Mid-West was the worst affected region. In fact, three of the 75
districts – Rukum, Rolpa, and Dang of the Mid-West development region
– share nearly 15 percent of the total causalities.
For the empirical assessment of conflict in this paper, conflict in a
district was measured in two ways: the level of insecurity (high or low)
and the number of people killed. Two linear regression models were
estimated to look into the causes of conflict. In one model, a dummy
variable represented the level of insecurity; the high level of insecurity
was considered the presence of insecurity, whereas the low level of
insecurity was considered the absence of conflict. The data on the level of
insecurity was obtained from the classification of districts by the UN
system of Nepal. In another regression model, the number of killed
persons was the dependent variable, and altogether 21 independent
variables were included for estimating their effect on the conflict.
The estimated results of the first regression model (level of
insecurity as dummy dependent variable) suggested that economic, social
and natural factors such as poverty incidence, income, food security,
proportion of female in non-agricultural operation, composite
development index, elevation, and caste polarization influenced the level
of insecurity in a district. In particular, poverty incidence and low caloric
intake were positively associated with conflict, whereas increase in
income, share of female in non-agricultural occupation, level of overall
development, proportion of Janjati population and elevation were found to
dampen the likelihood of insecurity.
The second model estimated with the number of people killed in a
district as the dependent variable suggested a different set of variables to
affect the intensity of conflict. Literacy rate and proportion of Janjati
population were negatively related with the number of killings, whereas an
increase in food insecurity, share of female in non-agricultural occupation
and the proportion of forest area aggravated the conflict. It is critical to
note that this model found a positive association between the proportion of
female in non-agricultural operation and the intensity of conflict, whereas
the other model suggested a negative association between the two. This
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contradictory set of findings needs further investigation. However, there is
no contradiction between the two models in the finding that the intensity
of conflict was higher in a district with a larger proportion of forest.
The results of the above two models are generally comparable with
those of previous studies. Yet, this study has value addition in two aspects.
The first is the finding that conflict is not only due to economic reasons
but also because of social and ethnic reasons. This is evident from a
negative relationship of level of insecurity with the proportion of Janajati
population. In a district where the proportion of Janajati population was
higher, the level of insecurity was lower. This finding is in conformity
with the finding of few other studies including that of Gurung (2004), who
found an inverse relation between the proportion of Janjati population and
number of insurgency-related deaths. In particular, Gurung found that the
Western Hill districts with the highest number of insurgency-related
deaths had the second lowest proportion of Janjati population, while the
Central Mountain districts, with the lowest insurgency-related deaths, had
the highest proportion of Janjatis. However, such a clear negative relation
was not evident in case of Dalit population of Nepal.
The second important value addition of this study is that conflict is
a result of mismatch between political empowerment and economic
empowerment. With the growing political empowerment, people were not
becoming more economically empowered, and thus there was conflict.
This finding has a significant policy implication for improving service
delivery and for providing employment and income earning opportunities
in districts. The overall conclusion of the present study is that there is a
need for recovery and reconstruction in all the three dimensions –
political, economic and social, and that an over-emphasis on any one
dimension can jeopardize the post-conflict situation and obstruct the way
to a lasting peace. The overall policy implications of the findings are that
increasing employment and income opportunities, improving food
security, and decreasing caste polarization, together with bringing political
progression as per the Comprehensive Peace Accord could prevent
conflict relapse in Nepal. If the state fails to meet the rising expectations
of the people, it would be difficult to bring a long lasting peace in the
country. This vindicates the strategies taken by the Government of Nepal
in the formulation of three-year interim plan, which focuses on creation of
employment with the lens of inclusion and reintegration through massive
investment in rehabilitation and reconstruction, and successive progression
of the state.
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